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ABSTRACT 
There are many hurdles that adult adoptees face when seeking access to personal 
information contained in original birth records or adoption proceedings. One such 
hurdle is the widely-used good cause standard, which requires adoptees seeking 
information to show good cause to obtain access. This standard is problematic 
primarily for its vagueness. Very few jurisdictions that use this standard define 
“good cause” in any meaningful way, and case law interpreting good cause statutory 
language is inconsistent at best. Although it is meant to protect the privacy interests 
of all parties in an adoption proceeding, the good cause standard acts as a barrier to 
those seeking information about their history. While recognizing that progressive 
legislative solutions are ideal, this Note proposes to shift the burden in jurisdictions 
where the good cause standard still applies; courts should be required to show good 
cause to keep records sealed, consistent with other areas of records access and first 
amendment jurisprudence. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
e closes his laptop after writing an unremarkable email about his 
current endeavors and trials, the most recent link in a long chain 
of communications. Looking back into the email chain, the topics 
become increasingly more sensitive, discussing relatives he has never 
met or meeting the brother he never knew he had. Peering further back 
into the chain of emails reveals a flood of emotions between the writer 
and the recipient, expressing gratitude for entering one another’s lives, 
and affirming a part of them that, in his case, has been missing for a 
lifetime. There is joy in the emails, and an eagerness to learn all that 
the other could possibly convey. 
The genesis of this long chain of communications goes back to the 
moment the writer first met his biological mother. This moment was 
not exclusively their own, as it would not have been made possible 
without the unwavering support from the writer’s loved ones, who 
never dissuaded him from tracing his biological past. The moment of 
reunification affirms the close familial bond that every human being 
understands to be fundamental—the bond between a biological mother 
and her child. But unlike all those who have distant memories made 
hazy with an accumulation of constant contact and the passage of time, 
the writer’s first memory of his biological mother is as clear as day. 
This memory remains fresh because the writer did not meet the woman 
long ago as an infant, but rather, as a fully matured adult. He reminds 
himself that she appreciates the moment they shared as much as he 
does, which enables him to settle his mind and realize that he is 
blessed. 
The writer does not forget, however, that there are many other 
adult adoptees like himself who cannot make contact with their 
biological parents. Whereas the writer sought out his biological mother 
for personal fulfillment, other adult adoptees may seek out their 
biological parents for different reasons, such as exploration of their 
medical histories,
1
 or identification of property rights.
2
 Accessing 
court adoption proceedings or birth records can provide adult adoptees 
with a wealth of information about their past, however gaining access 
to these documents can prove quite burdensome. Unlike non-adopted 
adults, who are able to look into their past uninhibitedly simply by 
                                                          
1
 In re Adoption of Spinks, 232 S.E.2d 479, 482-83 (N.C. Ct. App. 1977). 
2
 Massey v. Parker, 369 So. 2d 1310, 1314 (La. 1979). 
H 
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virtue of being raised by biological parents, adult adoptees often face 
significant obstacles when trying to connect the dots of their earlier 
years. Perhaps the greatest barrier that adult adoptees face is the 
common law “good cause” requirement to access sealed records.
3
 
This Note examines the “good cause” standard for accessing 
adoption records and explores its scope. Further, this Note identifies 
the hurdles that the good cause standard creates when adult adoptees 
attempt to access their birth or adoption records, and suggests a 
possible solution by advocating for a shift in the burden of proof from 
the adult adoptee to the court. The court would be required to show 
good cause to keep records sealed in a manner similar to common 
practices in other record requesting scenarios. This reform would 
likely require a qualified consent otherwise in favor of the adult 
adoptee, consistent with shifting societal attitudes toward adoption and 
transparency. 
II.  THE GOOD CAUSE STANDARD 
In the area of records access law, there is a long recognized right of 
access to public records.
4
 Public policy recognizes “the citizen’s desire 
to keep a watchful eye on the workings of public agencies.”
5
 This right 
of access applies to all “judicial decisions and the documents which 
comprise the bases of those decisions,”
6
 including hearings, 
depositions, and conferences. There is a strong common 
law presumption in favor of public access to records filed with the 
court in conjunction with any case, civil or criminal.
7
 There is also a 
constitutional presumption in favor of public access, unless there is a 
compelling government interest, and the terms of any secrecy order are 
narrowly tailored to serve that interest.
8
 For the purposes of this Note, 
whether the right of access stems from the Constitution or the common 
law is of little concern. Factual circumstances under which the need 
for privacy is strong enough to outweigh the common law right of 
access, yet not compelling enough to overcome the constitutional right 
                                                          
3
 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 210, § 5C (1972). 
4
 Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978). 
5
 Id. at 598. 
6
 Grove Fresh Distribs. v. Everfresh Juice, 24 F.3d 893, 898 (7th Cir. 1994). 
7
 Wilson v. Am. Motors Corp., 759 F.2d 1568, 1569-70 (11th Cir. 1985). 
8
 Globe Newspaper Co. v. Super. Ct., 457 U.S. 596, 606-07 (1982). 
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of access, would be quite novel indeed. But no matter the source, the 
right of access can be described best as a “presumption—however 
gauged—in favor of public access to judicial records.”
9
 
This presumption applies to more areas of judiciary law than just 
trial records. One example is the area of settlement agreements. Parties 
that wish to seal records as part of an integrated settlement agreement, 
even with the court’s active encouragement, must still demonstrate 
good cause to keep them sealed from the public.
10
 Also, in a class 
action, a settlement agreement cannot prevent interested non-class 
member parties from intervening to seek access to the discovery 
materials, regardless of the terms of the agreement.
11
 
A second example lies in the area of discovery. Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 26(c) presumes a right of public access to discovery 
materials unless good cause is shown.
12
 Though the rule itself governs 
the issuance of protective orders during discovery, its permissive 
language indicates that “[u]nless the public has a presumptive right of 
access to discovery materials, the party seeking to protect the materials 
would have no need for a judicial order [because] the public would not 
be allowed to examine the materials in any event.”
13
 
A third example of legal arenas which are presumptively open to 
the public and press are criminal plea agreements and hearings. 
However, plea agreements for cooperative criminal defendants are not 
subject to the right of access until those agreements are properly 
filed.
14
 Also, the public does not have a right to access a plea 
agreement filed with a motion to seal the agreement that is withdrawn 
before the court can rule on the sealing.
15
 These two subtle variations 
                                                          
9
 Nixon, 435 U.S. at 602. 
10
 Brown v. Advantage Eng’g, Inc., 960 F.2d 1013, 1016 (11th Cir. 1992). 
11
 In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 821 F.2d 139, 144 (2d Cir. 1987). 
12
 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c); see also Agent Orange, 821 F.2d at 145-46 (“A plain 
reading of . . . Rule 26(c) demonstrates that the party seeking a protective order 
has the burden of showing that good cause exists for issuance of that order. It is 
equally apparent that the obverse also is true, . . . if good cause is not shown, the 
discovery materials in question should not receive judicial protection and 
therefore would be open [for public inspection]. . . . Any other conclusion 
effectively would negate the good cause requirement of Rule 26(c).”). 
13
 Agent Orange, 821 F.2d at 145-46. 
14
 See In re Wash. Post Co., 807 F.2d 383, 390 (4th Cir. 1986). 
15
 See United States v. El-Sayegh, 131 F.3d 158, 159 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
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in the law create a more qualified right of access to criminal plea 
agreements and hearings than a full right of access. 
Although courts strongly favor the presumption of public access, 
there are circumstances in which it can be overcome.
16
 Good cause is 
one measure of such circumstances and serves as an exception to the 
right of public access, essentially making the presumption rebuttable. 
The term itself can be simply defined as the circumstances that warrant 





 The legal test has two broad prongs. The first prong 
analyzes whether the proceeding has been historically open to the 
public.
19
 The second prong analyzes “whether the right of access 
fosters good operation of the courts and the government.”
20
 The party 
seeking to maintain confidentiality bears the burden of satisfying both 
prongs for the documents to remain sealed.
21
 In conjunction, the trial 
court must balance the interests of the parties involved based on the 
totality of the circumstances. If this burden is met, the district court 
must “base its decision [to maintain confidentiality] on a compelling 
reason and articulate the factual basis for its ruling, without relying on 
hypothesis or conjecture.”
22
 Once the shielding party has shown good 
cause, the burden to unseal shifts to the party seeking access.
23
 
Illustrative of this standard is Nixon v. Warner Communications. 
Nixon concerns a nuance of the sensitive material prohibition, where 
access to evidentiary exhibits was denied because their contents were 
already made public in the trial record.
24
 Certain audiotapes belonging 
to ex-President Nixon were introduced into evidence at a trial for one 
of his former advisors.
25
 The plaintiff wished to copy the tapes for 
                                                          
16
 See Wilson, 759 F.2d at 1570 (right of public access is presumed absent unusual 
circumstances). 
17
 See ROBERT TIMOTHY REAGAN, SEALING COURT RECORDS AND PROCEEDINGS: 
A POCKET GUIDE, 3-16 (Fed. Jud. Ctr., 2010) (emphasis added). 
18
 See Nixon, 435 U.S. at 598 (emphasis added). 
19




 Kamakana v. City of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178-79 (9th Cir. 2006). 
22
 Hagestad v. Tragesser, 49 F.3d 1430, 1434 (9th Cir. 1995). 
23
 Chi. Trib. Co. v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 263 F.3d 1304, 1314-15 (11th Cir. 
2001). 
24
 Nixon, 435 U.S. at 589. 
25
 Id. at 591. 
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broadcasting and sale to the public.
26
 In refusing to release the tapes, 
Justice Powell stated that under both the constitutional and common 
law rights of access, the public had no right to the actual tapes in the 
court’s possession, as historically there had never been a right to 
access physical evidence,
27
 and the contents of the tapes had already 
been made public and widely disseminated.
28
 
Although Nixon did not fully explore whether the plaintiff met its 
burden to show good cause, the case did identify situations where the 
right of access has been denied for various reasons. For example, trade 
secrets and other sources of business information that might harm a 
litigant’s competitive standing are not disclosed, due to their sensitive 
nature.
29
 Additionally, the right of access cannot be “used to gratify 
private spite or promote public scandal” through the publication of 
“the painful and sometimes disgusting details of a divorce case.”
30
 
“Similarly, courts have refused to permit their files to serve as 
reservoirs of libelous statements for press consumption.”
31
 Consistent 
with this sentiment, Justice Powell further supported his denial of 
access to the tapes by stating that “[t]he [C]ourt—as custodian of tapes 
obtained by subpoena over the opposition of a sitting President . . . has 
a responsibility to exercise an informed discretion as to release of the 
tapes, with a sensitive appreciation of the circumstances that led to 
their production.”
32
 In accord, the Sixth Circuit has suggested that a 
defendant’s right to a fair trial, certain privacy rights of participants or 
third parties, trade secrets, and national security are virtually the only 
reasons which would justify a total closure of public records.
33
 
In addition to the compelling reasons described above, the 
presumption of public access to court records is further limited on a 
state level. For example, New York articulated areas of law where it 
has traditionally (writer’s emphasis) prevented public access: “in all 
proceedings and trials in cases for divorce, seduction, abortion, rape, 




 Id. at 608-09. 
28
 Id. at 609. 
29
 Id. at 598 (emphasis added). 
30




 Id. at 603. 
33
 Brown & Williamson Tobacco v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 710 F.2d 1165, 1179 
(6th Cir. 1983). 
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assault with intent to commit rape, sodomy, bastardy or filiation, the 
court may, in its discretion, exclude therefrom all persons who are not 
directly interested therein, excepting jurors, witnesses, and officers of 
the court.”
34
 New York also limits public access to family court 
proceedings by statute.
35
 Although Section 166 of the Family Court 
Act allows the court to permit public inspection of papers or records in 
a particular case upon completion of an application process, this 
procedure does not cause the record to be made available to the 
general public at the courthouse.
36
 Most relevant to the subject of this 
Note, New York also has a statutory prohibition on public access to 
adoption orders.
37
 The relevant statute provides: 
 
No person shall be allowed access to such sealed records and 
order and any index thereof except upon an order of a judge or 
surrogate of the court in which the order was made or of a justice 
of the supreme court. No order for disclosure or access and 
inspection shall be granted except on good cause shown and on 
due notice to the adoptive parents and to such additional persons as 




Other examples of restriction to the public’s right of access include 





 and records that identify jurors.
41
 
With such a large array of considerations and consequences 
involving matters exempt from the public right of access, it makes 
sense to afford trial judges the discretion to prohibit the general public 
from reviewing any court record. Judge Michael Boudin, while sitting 
on the First Circuit Court of Appeals, explained that courts needed 
                                                          
34
 COMM’N TO PUBLIC ACCESS TO COURT RECORDS, REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUDGE 
OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, 19 (2004) (citing N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW § 4 
(2003)). 
35
 N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 166 (1962). 
36
 COMM’N TO PUBLIC ACCESS, supra note 35 (citing N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 166). 
37
 N.Y. DOM. REL. § 114 (1994). 
38
 Id. § 114(2). 
39
 COMM’N TO PUBLIC ACCESS, supra note 35 (citing N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 50-
b (2006)). 
40
 COMM’N TO PUBLIC ACCESS, supra note 35 (citing N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW 
§ 190.25(4) (2014), N.Y. PENAL Law § 215.70 (1980)). 
41
 COMM’N TO PUBLIC ACCESS, supra note 35 (citing N.Y. JUD. LAW § 509(a) 
(1996)). 
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“wide latitude” and “broad discretion” regarding when and what 
degree of confidentiality protection is needed. Boudin believed that 
courts should be afforded “great deference . . . [when] framing and 
administering” such protection.
42
 Yet this kind of discretion can prove 
problematic for an adult adoptee. What guidance does the public’s 
presumed right of access offer a trial judge in a family court 
proceeding that is traditionally kept secret? Can precedent be reliable 
when the nebulous
43
 good cause standard requires only that a trial 
judge consider all the circumstances and then simply decide? Are the 
policy considerations supporting the public’s right of access and its 
good cause limitation relevant to matters concerning adoptions? The 
ability to answer these questions requires an understanding of how 
states handle adoptions. 
III. ADOPTION LAW 
Adoption laws in the United States vary widely. Traditionally, 
adoption law is set by the states and each state has its own governing 
statute. There is no uniform standard for adoption practices in the 
United States. The closest thing to a uniform standard is the Uniform 
Adoption Act (UAA).
44
 The UAA was drafted in 1994, and aims to 
reduce the “extraordinarily confusing system of state, federal, and 
international laws and regulations.”
45
 Indeed, the UAA ambitiously 
sets out to create an adoption code that is: (1) consistent with relevant 
federal constitutional and statutory law;
46
 (2) delineates the legal 
requirements and consequences of different kinds of adoption;
47
 (3) 
                                                          
42
 Poliquin v. Garden Way, Inc., 989 F.2d 527, 532 (1st Cir. 1993). 
43
 Justice Powell conceded that “[i]t is difficult to distill from the relatively few 
judicial decisions a comprehensive definition of what is referred to as the 
common-law right of access or to identify all the factors to be weighed in 
determining whether access is appropriate. The few cases that have recognized 
such a right do agree that the decision as to access is one best left to the sound 
discretion of the trial court, a discretion to be exercised in light of the relevant 
facts and circumstances of the particular case. In any event, we need not 
undertake to delineate precisely the contours of the common-law right, as we 
assume, arguendo, that it applies to the tapes at issue here.” Nixon, 435 U.S. at 
598-99. 
44
 UNIF. ADOPTION ACT (1994). 
45
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promotes the integrity and finality of adoptions while discouraging 
“trafficking” in minors;
48
 (4) respects the choices made by the parties 
to an adoption about how much confidentiality or openness they prefer 
in their relations with each other, subject, however, to judicial 
protection of the adoptee’s welfare;
49
 and (5) promotes the interest of 
minor children in being raised by individuals who are committed to, 
and capable of, caring for them. 
50
 The UAA also provides the layman 
with a basic semblance of the adoption process. The UAA allows any 
individual to adopt or be adopted by another for the purpose of 
creating a parent-child relationship between them.
51
 The biological 
parent or parents must first relinquish all rights to their child.
52
 The 
relinquished child is usually placed in the temporary custody of an 
agency, until suitable parents can be found.
53
 Naturally, prospective 
parents must undergo a screening and evaluation process to assess 
parental fitness.
54
 Prospective parents then commence a civil 
proceeding in a closed court.
55
 A trial judge will then issue a decree of 
adoption.
56
 Following the decree, a new birth certificate will be 
issued.
57
 Typically, all documents, exhibits, and data pertaining to the 




Most adoption statutes have provisions that enable adult adoptees 
to access their sealed court records. States employ a wide variety of 
approaches in regard to requests to obtain records relating to adoption 
proceedings, some of which share common elements. One of these 
approaches grants the adult adoptee seeking court records unfettered 
access. This category places no legal burden on the adult adoptee 
seeking information. For example, Tennessee
59
 grants this unfettered 








 Id. § 1-102. 
52
 See Id. § 2-403, 2-406-07. 
53
 See Id. § 2-103, 2-105, 3-204. 
54
 Id. § 2-201. 
55
 Id. § 3-203. 
56
 Id. § 3-705. 
57
 Id. § 3-802. 
58
 Id. § 6-101-02. 
59
 TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-127 (1996). 
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access, and allows adult adoptees unrestricted access to their original 
adoption proceedings after reaching the age of twenty-one.
60
 The only 
burden on the adult adoptee is an administrative burden, requiring the 
adoptee seeking records to file a written request to the Department of 
Public Welfare.
61
 This is the ideal approach for an adult adoptee, and 
is one of the most comprehensive and progressive statutes in the 
country concerning the recognition of adult adoptees’ right to access 
information about themselves. 
South Dakota and Oregon both follow a similar approach. South 
Dakota allows adult adoptees unfettered access to adoption 
proceedings upon reaching the “age of maturity.”
62
 South Dakota has 
also created a voluntary adoption registry to facilitate the exchange of 
information between adoptees and birth parents.
63
 Oregon specifies the 
age of 18 as the age at which adult adoptees can access their adoption 
proceedings,
64
 and also operates a voluntary adoption registry.
65
 
Another approach acknowledges and accommodates adult 
adoptees’ interest in their own adoption proceedings, but with 
limitations. Alabama uses such an approach, allowing adult adoptees 
to access their original birth certificates when they turn nineteen.
66
 
However, the state also permits birth parents to specify a contact 
preference if and when an adult adoptee requests his or her original 
birth certificate from the State Registrar of Vital Statistics.
67
 
Additionally, birth parents have the option to simply attach a medical 
history with every issuance of a new birth certificate to the adopting 
parents.
68
 But, the records for the adoption proceeding itself remain 
sealed, except “for good cause shown.”
69
 No statutory provisions 
further explain how good cause is defined in this instance. 
                                                          
60
 Id. § 36-1-127(b)(3)(A). 
61
 Id. § 36-1-127(h). 
62
 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-6-15 (1986). 
63
 Id. § 25-6-15.3. 
64
 OR. REV. STAT. § 109.319 (4)(b) (2015). 
65
 Id. § 109.430 (2015). 
66
 See ALA. CODE § 26-10A-31(c) (2000); see also id. § 22-9A-12(c). 
67




 Id. § 26-10A-31(c). 
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Arizona requires adult adoptees to petition the court for access to 
adoption proceedings.
70
 The Arizona statute requires a court order to 
access non-identifying information, and the adult adoptee must 
establish a “compelling need” for the disclosure of the information, 
absent consent of the birth parents.
71
 This “compelling need” standard 
is not defined within the statute. There are few illustrative cases in 
Arizona, and those that attempt to provide insight may leave adult 
adoptees with more questions than answers. In one case, Arizona 
concluded that the request to access the adoption records to obtain 
information about service of process presented a [compelling interest] 
to unseal the file, in light of a possible jurisdictional defect.
72
 In 
another case, the integrity of the judicial process was held to be a 
compelling interest under circumstances where parties who relied on a 
trial judge’s express assurances would be harmed by release of a 
video.
73
 These cases offer no guidance to adult adoptees seeking 
sealed records for other, perhaps more personal reasons. 
Echoing the “compelling need” standard is the “good cause” 
standard. This widely used standard, applied in states such as 
Vermont, Georgia, and Massachusetts, is the standard adopted by the 
UAA.
74
 Albeit, Vermont is the only state to have actually implemented 
the UAA thus far.
75
 Georgia adoption law stipulates: 
 
Records may be examined by the parties at interest in the 
adoption and their attorneys when, after written petition has been 
presented to the court having jurisdiction and after the department 
and the appropriate child-placing agency have received at least 30 
days’ prior written notice of the filing of such petition, the matter 
has come on before the court in chambers and, good cause having 





                                                          
70
 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-120(B) (2003). 
71
 Id. § 8-121(D). 
72
 In re Hernandez, 2012 Ariz. App. Unpub. LEXIS 618 at *12 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
2012). 
73
 Perry v. Brown, 667 F.3d 1078, 1084 (9th Cir. 2012). 
74
 UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 6-105(c)(1). 
75
 Legislative Fact Sheet- Adoption Act (1994), available at http://www
.uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Adoption%20Act%20(1994). 
76
 GA. CODE ANN. § 19-8-23(a) (2011). 
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Massachusetts adoption law, which also contains a good cause 
standard, provides: 
 
All petitions for adoption, all reports submitted thereunder and 
all pleadings, papers or documents filed in connection therewith, 
docket entries in the permanent docket and record books shall not 
be available for inspection, unless a judge of probate of the county 





Nowhere in the statutory scheme of either of these states’ codes is 
“good cause” defined. 
The approaches discussed above are not exhaustive. Of all the 
possible approaches that states could utilize to address the question of 
access to adoption proceedings, the good cause standard, as written in 
Georgia and Massachusetts state statutes, creates the biggest hurdle for 
adult adoptees due to uncertainty and vagueness. 
IV.  INCONSISTENCY IN GOOD CAUSE JURISDICTIONS 
When addressing the issue of adult adoptees seeking access to their 
birth records or adoption proceedings, there is no clear standard 
articulated in a good cause provision. As described above,
78
 good 
cause is viewed as a way to balance interests. Indeed, the application 
of a balancing test would likely be adequate in cases where adult 
adoptees seek access to their adoption records, provided courts have 
the means to intelligently apply it. Courts in good cause jurisdictions 
have noted the lack of guidance they receive from state legislatures 
when determining what interests to balance. When confronted with the 
issue, some courts have simply sidestepped it, choosing to deny access 
to the adult adoptee and wait for the legislature to define good cause.
79
 
For example, in Backes v. Catholic Family & Community Services, a 
New Jersey trial court refused to appoint an intermediary that would 
have allowed an adult adoptee to make contact with his birth parents 
because there was no express authority for the court to do so, despite 
the presence of statutory “good cause” language.
80
 Though the court 
                                                          
77
 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 210, § 5C (2015). 
78
 See supra Part II. 
79
 Backes v. Cath. Fam. & Cmty. Servs., 509 A.2d 283 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 
1985). 
80
 Id. at 294. 
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followed prior case law by considering both parental privacy 
interests
81
 and the adult adoptee’s interests in his own medical history 
and psychological health,
82
 it effectively held that unknown policy 
considerations in pending legislation outweighed an adult adoptee’s 
interest in accessing personal information.
83
 
Other courts have recognized an implied good cause standard from 
vague statutory schemes.
84
 For example, In re Roger B. concerned a 
challenge to a discretionary statute by an adult adoptee who sought 
information about his birth family because of feelings of inadequacy 
and uncertainty as to his background based solely on the fact that he 
was adopted.
85
 The relevant statute sealed adoption records and 
original birth records, and only permitted unsealing with a valid court 
order.
86
 The adoptee challenged the statute, claiming that it infringed 
upon a fundamental right, created a suspect classification in violation 
of the Equal Protection clause of the United States Constitution, and 
violated his right to receive information.
87
 While acknowledging that 
information regarding one’s background, heritage, and heredity is 
important to one’s identity, the court also noted that such information 
was not within the ambit of any zone of privacy protected by the 
Constitution, and thus did not implicate a fundamental right.
88
 The 
court then struck down the assertion that the statute created a suspect 
class, noting that the status of an adoptee is created by a legal 
proceeding,
89
 and does not result from “an immutable characteristic 
determined solely by the accident of birth.”
90
 Finally, while 
acknowledging that the right to receive information and ideas is 
generally protected, the court noted that the Constitution does not 
guarantee a right of access to information that is not available to the 
public generally.
91
 With no express statutory language or prior case 
                                                          
81
 Id. at 292. 
82
 Id. at 293. 
83
 Id. at 294. 
84
 See In re Roger B., 418 N.E.2d 751 (Ill. 1981). 
85






 Id. at 754. 
89
 Id. at 756. 
90
 Id. (quoting Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684-86 (1973)). 
91
 Id. at 757. 
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law to guide its decisions, the Supreme Court of Illinois nonetheless 
found that the discretionary standard in the relevant statute survived 
the adoptee’s constitutional challenge, comparatively implying that 
good cause satisfactorily protected the rights of the parties involved.
92
 
Some state statutes offer minimal guidance, such as allowing 
access when unsealing an adoptee’s record meets a “best interests of 
the child” standard.
93
 Others permit unsealing except under 
circumstances where the adoptee, birth parents, or adoptive parents 
would be prejudiced by the disclosure.
94
 Judges grasping for guidance 
in interpreting good cause provisions not only receive little-to-nothing 
from their respective legislatures, but also, as noted in Spinks, find 
persuasive authority from other jurisdictions unsupportive.
95
 
Such frustration is understandable considering the patchwork of 
circumstances which satisfy the good cause standard today. Courts 
have unsealed records based on severe psychological problems caused 
by lack of information.
96
 Records have been unsealed to aid in 
determining an “adopted person’s right of inheritance from his natural 
parents.”
97
 The good cause standard has also been met by a religious 
obligation to identify one’s ancestors.
98
 Furthermore, in past cases 
where the good cause standard has been satisfied, adult adoptees have 
been successful in accessing records based on an “intense” 
psychological need to know.
99
 This last circumstance is particularly 
puzzling, because courts have held that “mere curiosity” does not 
establish good cause.
100
 What, then, is the difference between an 
intense psychological need to know and mere curiosity? Even more 
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frustrating to the adult adoptee is the denial of any explanation as to 
why the good cause standard was not met.
101
 
V.  BALANCING INTERESTS 
A. Privacy 
Privacy and confidentiality are central to the debate surrounding 
adult adoptees’ abilities to access adoption proceedings. Standing 
alone, these terms appear just as broad as the good cause standard 
itself, necessitating a closer look at what privacy concerns arise in 
adoption proceedings. 
In Olmstead v. United States, Justice Taft stated that “the right to 
be let alone [is] the most comprehensive of rights and the right most 
valued by civilized men.”
102
 As discussed above, adoption proceedings 
are traditionally kept secret from the public, and historically, courts 
have been very protective of information in these proceedings when 
third parties request access to such information.
103
 In People v. Doe, a 
New York grand jury issued a subpoena requiring the county clerk to 
produce the sealed records for all adoptions approved in the preceding 
year.
104
 The court held that the request was too broad and that good 
cause had not been shown.
105
 The court noted that, during adoption 
proceedings, inquiry is made into many intimate details of the lives of 
the biological parents, the adoptive parents, and others connected with 
the proceeding.
106
 The court afforded substantial weight to a biological 
mother and her child’s desire to prevent illegitimate births from being 
publicized.
107
 Because the adoption process, an area of vital public 
interest, required free and frank disclosure of confidential information, 
the court maintained that information obtained in the proceeding 
should be kept secret unless disclosure was absolutely necessary.
108
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People v. Doe contemplated that bearing an illegitimate child 
would have a disparaging impact on the birth parents, and justified 
sealing adoption proceedings from the general public. Other courts 
have reasoned that under some circumstances, the adoption process 
can be quite traumatic for birth parents.
109
 In Application of Maples, 
the Missouri Supreme Court stated the latter, articulating the need for 
confidentiality during adoption proceedings.
110
 In arguably an overly 
broad assertion, the court found that adoptions were often the product 
of unfortunate mistakes, 
111
 and that the decision to give a child up for 
adoption is agonizing for birth parents.
112
 The court noted the value of 
secrecy surrounding adoption proceedings, stating that it gave solace 
to troubled birth parents who sought to hide circumstances of 
abandonment or neglect from their birth children.
113
 
In addition to those of birth parents, the privacy interests of 
adoptive parents are also considered in adoption proceedings. The 
Illinois Supreme Court in In re Roger B stated that “[c]onfidentiality 
also must be promoted to protect the right of the adopting parents.”
114
 
The court regarded the decision to adopt as an intimate one—by taking 
a child “into their home adopting parents have taken into their home a 
child whom they will regard as their own and whom they will love, 
support, and raise as an integral part of the family unit.”
115
 The court 
further reasoned that adoptive parents need the opportunity to form a 
stable family relationship free from outside intrusion.
116
 Such concerns 
are the premise of the adoptive parents’ right to privacy. 
Last but not least, courts have acknowledged the privacy interests 
of adoptees. Sealing adoption records fully protects the adoptee’s 
privacy interest during childhood.
117
 The sealed record shields the 
adoptee and his or her new family from intrusion by the birth 
family.
118
 This protects the adoptee “from any stigma resulting from 
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illegitimacy, neglect, or abuse.”
119
 “The preclusion of outside 
interference allows the adopted child to develop a relationship of love 
and cohesiveness with the new family unit.”
120
 
In addition to privacy rights, courts have also recognized the 
state’s interest in protecting the integrity of the adoption system as a 
whole. Courts have recognized that adoption exists “as a humane 
solution to the serious social problem of children who are, or may 
become unwanted, abused, or neglected.”
121
 The public’s interest in 
protecting the adoption process lies in assuring that policy and practice 
will not diminish the pool of prospective adoptive parents or “the 
willingness of biological parents to make decisions which are best for 




In contrast to the well-articulated arguments in favor of secrecy, 
courts are slowly recognizing that permitting access to adoption 
records provides benefits to adult adoptees. One of these benefits is 
increased access to medical information. For example, in Chattman v. 
Bennett, a married woman, wanting to begin her own family, made a 
request to inspect her adoption records to ascertain whether there were 
any genetic or hereditary factors in her background that might be 
detrimental to her future children.
123
 Her concern constituted “good 
cause” to allow her access to any medical reports or related matter 
contained in the records of her adoption, and the court granted her 
request.
124
 The subsequent order also directed that any non-pertinent 
information be deleted, including the names of her natural parents.
125
 
The court supported its decision with reference to a New York 
Domestic Relations Law statute which governed the furnishing of an 
adopted child’s medical history to the adoptive parents.
126
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Objectively, medical information has great value and may 
significantly impact the health of an adult adoptee. A more subjective 
position suggests simple knowledge of the identity of his or her 
biological parents may be important to an adult adoptee. Mills v. 
Atlantic City Dep’t of Vital Stat. explored how much weight to give 
this need to know.
127
 To address the question of whether a 
psychological need to know satisfied good cause, the court discussed 
the testimony and other evidence at length.
128
 While acknowledging 
that mere curiosity is insufficient to satisfy good cause, the court 
determined that “[a]n adoptee who is moved to a court proceeding 
such as the one here is impelled by a need to know which is far deeper 
than ‘mere curiosity.’”
129
 The court was convinced that the adult 
adoptee’s testimony had “its origins in the psychological makeup of 
the adoptee’s identity, self-image and perceptions of reality.”
130
 The 
court noted the testimony of another adult adoptee who searched for 
and found her natural mother, and stated that “in addition to the desire 
to be able to relate hereditary and ethnic background information to 
her children, she was driven to search by a deep-seated feeling of 
unreality—that her origin was not from a human being but an adoption 
agency.”
131
 The court recognized that those feelings “manifest 
themselves in physical symptoms such as nervousness or insomnia.”
132
 
Those feelings also present “a psychological inability of the adoptees 
to devote themselves fully and wholeheartedly to their efforts. There 




Corroborating this evidence, an expert witness testified “that the 
need to search, far from being curiosity, arises from a deficiency in 
their sense of self.”
134
 He further explained that “[i]n the case of an 
adopted child the natural parents are unseen and unreal to the adoptee. 
He or she is not able to de-mythologize them and a continuing sense of 
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unreality pervades the self-image.”
135
 Based on the combined 
testimony, the court was convinced that this compelling psychological 




VI.  CONSIDERATIONS AND SOLUTION 
How does a trial judge balance such sensitive considerations 
surrounding the privacy of all parties concerned, with the need for 
information that may be vital for the physical or psychological health 
of the adult adoptee? Ideally, a trial judge would not bear such a 
burden; there would be a legislative solution. Indeed, some courts have 
expressly mentioned that “. . . the Legislature, as the creator of the 
adoption process, is the appropriate forum to articulate changes in the 
procedure for releasing such information in order to reflect changes in 
societal attitudes.”
137
 As mentioned above, the Tennessee adoption 
statute provides what is perhaps the most comprehensive solution to 
the adult adoptee’s dilemma. But absent any guidance from their 
legislatures, states that abide by the good cause standard can, and 
should, take an alternative judicial measure to alleviate the hardship 
that good cause poses on adoptees. The current burden on the adoptee 
to show good cause to access records from his or her adoption 
proceedings should shift in such a manner that the court prove good 
cause to withhold access to such records. 
As discussed above, the burden is currently on the adult adoptee to 
demonstrate good cause when he or she wishes to unseal records. If 
the burden were to shift to the court to show good cause for 
withholding access, a trial judge would maintain the ability to preserve 
confidentiality when necessary while catering to an adult adoptee’s 
need to access information. This standard, first articulated in Mills, is 
consistent with the good cause standard as it applies to matters that are 
traditionally open to the public.
138
 The Mills court articulated the 
following “procedural criteria to be a solution which protects the rights 
of all parties, effectuates the intent of the Legislature and lessens the 
legal and financial burden . . . [on adoptees].”
139
 Should the adoptee 
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seeking access be a minor, then the burden to show good cause would 
be on the adoptee.
140
 The need for medical information or information 
regarding the minor’s heredity may constitute good cause in such a 
situation, but that determination can only be made after weighing the 
effect the revelation will have upon all parties and the best interests of 
the minor child.
141
 If the adoptee is an adult, however, the burden of 
proof shifts to the court to demonstrate that good cause is not 
present.
142
 This shift is predicated on the idea that “[i]n certain 
situations the request of the adult adoptee for information should be 
granted as a matter of course.”
143
 For example, if a birth parent files 
some indicia of consent to identification, access by the adult adoptee 
should be automatically allowed.
144
 This would have the additional 
effect of alleviating administrative burdens for adult adoptees, as they 
would be able to forego a court hearing in favor of a simple consent 
order or its equivalent.
145
 
Consider the hypothetical situation where a trial judge must 
balance an adult adoptee’s need to understand his or her medical 
history with the privacy concerns of a biological mother who 
conceived the adoptee as the unfortunate victim of rape or incest. 
Though jarring, this situation is within the contemplation of adoption 
statutes,
146
 and is not so far-fetched as to be beyond a trial judge’s 
expectation to encounter it. If a trial judge applied the modified good 
cause standard with burden shifting, the starting point would favor 
disclosure. Yet, because of the circumstances surrounding the 
adoptee’s birth, the privacy interests of the birth mother could truly 
outweigh traditionally recognized circumstances supporting disclosure 
(even the need to access medical information) in this situation. Under 
the new burden shifting approach, the trial judge would demonstrate 
good cause to keep the records sealed, and the birth mother’s privacy 
would be maintained thereby satisfying the good cause standard. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
An adult adoptee attempting to access his or her own adoption 
proceedings will not receive help in states that permit access only upon 
showing good cause. It must seem arbitrary, almost capricious, to an 
adoptee who is not permitted to inspect adoption records because he or 
she does not show good cause. Though an ideal solution would come 
from the legislature, courts must grapple with the good cause standard 
until a better approach is adopted (pun intended). There is very little 
case law consistent enough to serve as precedent when applying the 
good cause standard. Moreover, statutes containing vague and 
ambiguous language offer little guidance to the adoptee seeking access 
to his or her records. Efforts like the Uniform Adoption Act only 
become part of the problem.
147
 While navigating this confusing legal 
terrain, trial judges must balance very important interests. Privacy 
concerns for all parties involved must be weighed carefully against the 
needs of adult adoptees. 
Shifting the burden to the courts to show good cause to keep 
records sealed would be a step in the right direction. The shift would 
account for the needs of adult adoptees that were not contemplated 
when statutes requiring a showing of good cause were drafted. Should 
interests diverge enough, the court would still have the ability to 
prevent disclosure. Burden shifting would also be minimally offensive 
to the legislative intent behind disclosure statutes. It is unlikely that the 
number of records requests by adult adoptees will decrease in the 
foreseeable future, and hopefully, a new, consistent body of 
jurisprudence using the new good cause standard will make it much 
easier for courts to balance the interests of all parties. 
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